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Highlights
•	 Projects	of	common	interest	are	important	high-value	projects	for	achieving	
EU	 energy	 and	 climate	 policy	 objectives.	To	 the	 extent	 that	 these	 projects	
have	higher	risks,	we	need	to	make	sure	that	the	regulatory	frameworks	also	
incentivize	investment	at	the	high	end	of	the	risk	spectrum.
•	 In	 this	 brief	 we	 discuss	 whether	 an	 adequate	 framework	 for	 projects	 of	
common	interest	implies	moving	towards	a	dedicated	regulatory	framework,	
concluding	that	this	is	not	necessarily	necessary.
•	 Some	Member	States	might	prefer	 to	apply	 their	default	 regulatory	 frame-
work	 to	 projects	 of	 common	 interest.	This	 approach	 avoids	 the	 additional	
costs	of	administering	another	framework.	However,	the	conventional	default	
framework	provides	the	same	return	for	all	infrastructure	investment,	imply-
ing	a	risk	of	underpaying	for	high-risk	investment	and	overpaying	for	low-
risk	investment.
•	 Other	Member	 States	might	 prefer	 to	 apply	 a	 dedicated	 regulatory	 frame-
work	for	important	infrastructure	investment	to	projects	of	common	interest.	
These	dedicated	frameworks	allow	dealing	with	underpaying	for	important	
investment	as	well	as	mitigating	the	risk	of	overpaying	by	adjusting	incentives	
to	the	value	and	risk	of	a	project.
•	 In	both	cases,	 the	EU	and	ACER	have	 important	 roles	 to	play	 in	ensuring	
that	 the	 regulatory	 framework	 applying	 to	 projects	 of	 common	 interest	 is	
adequate.	 Their	 roles	 could	 include	 assessing	 the	 applicable	 frameworks,	
assisting	NRAs	 with	multi-jurisdictional	 coordination,	 ensuring	 dedicated	
frameworks	for	investment	of	national	importance	apply	also	to	projects	of	
common	interest,	and	assisting	NRAs	on	a	voluntary	basis	with	performing	
case-by-case	assessments.	
Issue 2014/05 
September 2014
ISSN 1977-3919
2 ■  FSR - Policy Brief ■ Issue 2014/05 ■ September 2014
Background
The	default	national	regulatory	frameworks	that	apply	to	trans-
mission	 system	 operator	 (TSO)	 investments	 predominantly	
provide	 the	 same	 return	 to	 all	 electricity	 infrastructure	 pro-
jects,	 irrespective	of	 their	 value	 and	 irrespective	of	 their	 risk	
profile.	 If	 transmission	planning	works	well,	 only	 high-value	
projects	are	retained	for	investment,	but	they	can	be	very	het-
erogeneous	in	terms	of	their	risk	profile.	Therefore,	the	higher	
the	 return	 that	applies	 to	all	 investments,	 the	higher	 the	 risk	
of	overpaying	 for	 low-risk	high-value	projects,	 but	 the	 lower	
the	return	on	 investment,	 the	higher	 the	risk	of	underpaying	
for	 high-risk	 high-value	 projects.	 Moreover,	 independent	 of	
the	level	of	return,	the	current	practice	implies	a	bias	towards	
low-risk	 projects	 and	 delays	 or	 leads	 to	 underinvestment	 in	
high-risk	 projects	 that	 in	 some	 cases	 can	 be	 very	 important	
electricity	infrastructure	projects.
The	 fundamental	 problem	 of	 the	 default	 national	 regulatory	
frameworks	applies	especially	to	projects	of	common	interest.	
Indeed,	these	projects	tend	to	be	riskier	than	an	average	project	
for	 two	main	 reasons.	First,	 they	are	 typically	multi-jurisdic-
tion	projects	involving	multiple	authorities.	Such	projects	typi-
cally	take	longer	to	develop	in	terms	of	permit	granting,	cost	
approval,	project	 routing	etc.,	 leading	 to	higher	development	
cost	 risk.	 Second,	 projects	 of	 common	 interest	 tend	 to	 be	 of	
larger	 scale	and	use	more	 innovative	 technology,	 like	HVDC	
submarine	 cables,	 leading	 to	 higher	 construction	 cost	 risks.	
Despite	 the	 higher	 cost	 uncertainty,	 we	 want	 these	 projects	
to	 be	 built	 because	 they	 are,	 by	 definition1,	 strongly	 welfare	
improving	 for	Europe	and	of	 strategic	 importance	 to	achieve	
the	EU	climate	and	energy	policy	objectives.	
Some	Member	 States	have	 started	 to	 address	 the	problem	of	
their	default	national	 regulatory	 frameworks	by	developing	a	
dedicated	framework	for	important	investments.	Other	coun-
tries	continue	to	rely	on	their	default	frameworks.	In	this	brief,	
we	 argue	 that	 it	 could	 be	 left	 to	 the	 national	 level	 to	 decide	
whether	or	not	to	develop	such	a	dedicated	framework,	but	in	
both	cases	there	is	a	role	for	the	EU	and	ACER	to	ensure	that	
the	 applicable	 regulatory	 framework	 is	 adequate	 for	 projects	
of	common interest.	A	lack	of	adequate	investment	incentives	
for	TSOs	to	carry	out	these	investments	is	indeed	an	EU	issue	
rather	than	a	purely	national	issue. 
1.	 This	is	the	case	to	the	extent	that	we	already	have	a	good	method	and	
procedure	 for	 evaluating	 and	 selecting	 projects	 of	 common	 interest:	
Meeus,	L.,	von	der	Fehr,	N.H.,	Azevedo,	I.,	He,	X.,	Olmos,	L.,	Glachant,	
J.M.,	 2013.	Cost	 Benefit	Analysis	 in	 the	Context	 of	 the	 Energy	 Infra-
structure	 Package.	 Florence	 School	 of	 Regulation	 Policy	 Brief,	 Issue	
2013/02.	January	2013;	Keyaerts,	N.,	Glachant,	J.M.,	2014.	Cost-benefit	
analysis	 for	gas-infrastructure	projects.	Florence	School	of	Regulation	
Policy	Brief,	Issue	2014/03.	February	2014.	
This	brief	is	structured	in	three	parts.	We	first	discuss	why	some	
countries	 have	 introduced	 dedicated	 regulatory	 frameworks	
for	 important	 electricity	 infrastructure	 investments.	We	 then	
analyze	 the	main	 differences	 between	 these	 frameworks	 and	
the	default	national	regulatory	frameworks.	Finally,	we	discuss	
the	role	of	the	EU	and	ACER	to	ensure	an	adequate	regulatory	
framework	for	projects	of	common	interest	for	Member	States	
with	and	without	a	dedicated	framework.	
1. Why some countries have introduced 
dedicated regulatory frameworks for 
important electricity infrastructure 
investments
At	first	sight,	the	dedicated	frameworks	seem	to	be	motivated	
by	 temporary	 exceptional	 challenges.	Countries	 refer	 to	pro-
moting	 competition,	 electricity	 market	 integration	 or	 prior-
itizing	strategically	important	or	socially	desirable	investment	
at	 national	 level.	They	 argue	 that	 to	meet	 their	 challenges,	 it	
is	necessary	to	temporarily	speed	up	the	needed	“exceptional	
investments”.
In	Box	1	we	analyze	dedicated	regulatory	frameworks	of	Italy,	
the	 US,	 Germany,	 the	 Netherlands,	 the	 UK2	 and	 France	 in	
terms	of	their	motivation	and	what	investments	they	consider	
eligible	for	their	respective	dedicated	frameworks.	We	find	that	
they	all	are	at	least	partially	motivated	by	national	policy	objec-
tives	such	as	a	reliable	grid,	a	competitive	market,	or	an	inte-
grated	market.	These	investment	are	thus	of	strategic	national	
importance	to	these	countries.	
Interestingly,	most	countries	define	quite	explicitly	what	pro-
jects	 they	 consider	 important	 and	 thus	 eligible.	The	 projects	
countries	have	in	mind	have	higher	risks:	they	are	multi-juris-
dictional	(interconnectors);	larger	scale	(large	domestic	lines);	
or	 more	 innovative	 (off-shore	 lines,	 electricity	 storage)	 than	
traditional	 investment.	 Some	 countries	 even	 mention	 these	
risks	 as	 additional	motivation	 for	 having	 a	 dedicated	 frame-
work.
By	setting	up	their	respective	dedicated	regulatory	frameworks	
for	important	investment	that	tends	to	have	higher	risk,	coun-
tries	explicitly	or	at	 least	implicitly	acknowledge	that	the	bias	
towards	low-risk	projects	created	by	default	national	regulatory	
frameworks	is	really	leading	to	underinvestment	in	important	
high-value	higher-risk	projects.
2.	 The	 UK	 has	 a	 dedicated	 framework	 for	 interconnectors	 (see	 Ofgem,	
CREG,	2011.	Cap	and	floor	regime	for	regulation	of	project	NEMO	and	
future	subsea	connectors.	Consultation	86/11,	28	June	2011.),	which	is	dis-
cussed	in	this	brief,	and	one	for	domestic	investment	that	is	called	Strate-
gic	Wider	Works	and	is	part	of	the	RIIO	framework	for	transmission	(see	
Ofgem,	2011.	Guidance	on	the	Strategic	Wider	Works	arrangements	in	the	
electricity	transmission	price	control,	RIIO-T1.	21	October	2013).
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Box 1: Countries background
 Italy 
Introduced: 2004; 
Motivation: speeding up investment for national strategy to 
promote competition, but framework also followed in the after-
math of a countrywide blackout on 28 September 2003; 
Eligible investment: interconnectors and congestion reducing 
domestic lines, technology deployment, and electricity storage 
technology. 
 US 
Introduced: 2006;
Motivation: a major blackout on 14 August 2003, decades of 
declining infrastructure investment, and inadequacy of the 
default regulatory framework; 
Eligible investment: interstate investment for improving 
regional reliability and reducing regional congestion.
 Germany 
Introduced: 2007; 
Motivation: speeding up significant grid expansion of superior 
public interest (e.g. Energiewende);  
Eligible investment: cross-regional, cross-border and off-shore 
grid expansion.
 The Netherlands 
Introduced: 2010;
Motivation: facilitating large investment that is socially desir-
able;
Eligible investment: all grid expansion necessary for achieving 
energy policy objectives. 
 UK 
Introduced: 2011; 
Motivation: speeding up EU market integration, promote com-
mercially-driven investment (an alternative to the “exemption” 
track), addressing the coordination risk of multi-jurisdictional 
projects, and adjusting remuneration to the higher risks of this 
type of investment;
Eligible investment: NEMO (Belgium-UK interconnector) and 
future subsea interconnectors.
 France
Introduced: 2013 (only first principles); 
Motivation: EU market integration, addressing additional com-
plexity of multi-jurisdictional projects, moving towards value-
driven remuneration;
Eligible investment: interconnectors.
2. Main differences between the dedicated 
regulatory frameworks for important 
electricity infrastructure investments 
and the default national frameworks 
Countries3	 have	 addressed	 underinvestment	 in	 important	
higher-risk	projects	by	reducing	the	risk	for	TSOs	to	invest	in	
these	projects,	and	by	increasing	their	return.	As	we	illustrate	
in	what	follows,	Netherlands	and	Germany	only	do	the	former,	
while	Italy,	France,	the	UK,	and	US	do	both	(Table	1);	yet	it	is	
too	soon	to	tell	what	combination	of	measures	works	best	and	
what	does	not	work:	
•	 Germany	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 have	 similar	 approaches.	
They	both	provide	more	regulatory	stability	and	thus	lower	
investment	risk	by	exempting	important	investment	projects	
from	their	respective	default	capex	efficiency	benchmarking	
for	one	regulatory	period.	Additionally,	they	both	advance	
the	timing	of	construction	cost	recognition	by	allowing	cost	
recovery	based	on	estimates	before	costs	are	final	after	con-
struction.	
•	 Italy	provides	regulatory	stability	by	extending	its	regulatory	
period	for	important	investments	to	twelve	years	compared	
to	 just	 four	years	 in	the	default	national	regulatory	frame-
work.	Additionally,	Italy	gives	a	fixed	premium	on	the	return	
on	investment	of	two	percent	to	all	eligible	investment.	
•	 France	 has	 extended	 the	 regulatory	 period	 of	 its	 planned	
dedicated	 framework	 to	 ten	 years.	 It	 is	 also	 planning	 to	
increase	 the	 return	on	 investment	 for	 important	high-risk	
projects	 by	 giving	 a	 combination	 of	 a	 flat	 lump-sum	 pre-
mium	and	variable	bonuses	and	penalties	that	will	be	estab-
lished	 after	 a	 case-by-case	 assessment	 of	 the	 investment’s	
value.
•	 The	UK	and	the	US	both	have	defined	a	regulatory	period	
that	 in	 principle	 matches	 the	 lifetime	 of	 the	 important	
investment	with	twenty	five	years	for	the	UK	and	an	unde-
fined	period	for	the	US,	respectively.	Both	also	advance	the	
approval	 for	 cost	 recovery	 on	 certain	 development	 costs	
such	as	study	costs.	The	US	additionally	foresees	in	progres-
sive	recovery	of	construction	costs	while	the	project	is	under	
construction.	 Both	 countries	 also	 increase	 the	 return	 on	
investment.	The	UK	sets	a	revenue	cap	and	floor	for	impor-
tant	investment,	while	the	US	gives	a	case-by-case	premium	
on	the	return	on	investment,	like	France.
3.	 See	also	the	survey	results	in	“Recommendation	of	the	Agency	for	the	
Cooperation	of	Energy	Regulators	No	03/2014	of	27	June	2014	on	incen-
tives	for	projects	of	common	interest	and	on	a	common	methodology	for	
risk	evaluation.”
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In	addition,	these	countries	have	also	taken	measures	to	keep	
the	 cost	 efficiency	 of	 these	 dedicated	 regulatory	 frameworks	
under	control.	Some	regulators	only	control	the	costs	by	lim-
iting	eligibility	for	the	dedicated	framework	to	certain	types	of	
projects,	e.g.	interconnectors	or	off-shore	infrastructure,	while	
others	also	assess	case-by-case	to	what	extent	projects	are	enti-
tled	to	claim	reduced	risk	and/or	higher	returns.	
•	 Germany,	the	Netherlands,	and	Italy	only	assess	whether	an	
investment	is	eligible	for	access	to	the	dedicated	regulatory	
framework.	
•	 France,	the	UK	and	the	US	do	a	case-by-case	project	assess-
ment.	In	the	US,	the	federal	regulator	(FERC)	received	new	
competences	 to	 do	 this	 and	 is	 now	 assessing	 all	 projects	
claiming	additional	incentives	under	the	dedicated4	frame-
work.	It	reviews	evidence	of	the	project	eligibility,	and	jus-
tification	 for	 additional	 incentives	 to	 complete	 the	project	
(see	Box	2).	
4.	 FERC,	 2006.	 Promoting	 Transmission	 Investment	 Through	 Pricing	
Reform.	116	FERC.	Order	679.	Docket	No.	RM06-4-000,	20	July	2006;	
FERC,	2012.	Promoting	Transmission	Investment	Through	Pricing	Re-
form.	141	FERC.	Docket	No.	RM11-26-000,	15	November	2012.
Table 1: Country experiences with dedicated regulatory frameworks for important electricity infrastructure 
investments
Reduced investment risk for important high-risk projects
Exemption from default capex efficiency 
benchmarking
v v
Increasing regulatory period v v v v
Advance timing of development cost 
recognition
v v
Advance timing of construction cost 
recognition
v v v
Increased return on investment for important high-risk projects
Fixed premium v
Case-by-case premium v v v
Controlling cost efficiency (avoid overpaying)
Assessment of eligibility v v v
Case-by-case assessment of eligibility, 
reduction of investment  risk and 
increase of return on investment
v v v
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A	case-by-case	approach	is	superior,	especially	if	the	risk	pro-
files	 of	 the	 projects	 are	 very	 heterogeneous.	 A	 case-by-case	
assessment	 indeed	 allows	mitigating	 the	 risk	 of	 underpaying	
for	 very	 high-value	 high-risk	 projects	 as	 well	 as	 avoiding	
overpaying	 for	high-value	moderate-risk	projects5,	whereas	a	
regime	that	only	controls	access,	giving	the	same	return	to	all	
eligible	investment	irrespective	of	heterogeneous	risk	profiles,	
is	 subject	 to	 the	 same	 deficiencies	 as	 the	 default	 regulatory	
frameworks.	This	 approach	 can	 however	 be	 costly	 to	 imple-
ment	administratively,	and	it	requires	also	new	skills	from	the	
regulatory	authorities	that	are	doing	the	assessments	and	from	
the	project	promoters	who	have	to	submit	substantiated	pro-
ject	proposals.	In	comparison,	the	default	national	regulatory	
frameworks	are	much	simpler	and	easier	to	administer	for	the	
involved	National	Regulatory	Authorities	(NRAs)	and	TSOs.
3. The role of the EU and ACER to ensure 
an adequate regulatory framework for 
projects of common interest 
In	this	section,	we	first	discuss	the	role	of	the	EU	and	ACER	for	
member	states	without	a	dedicated	regulatory	 framework	 for	
projects	of	common	interest,	and	then	for	member	states	that	
do	have	such	a	dedicated	framework	or	want	to	implement	one.
Member states without a dedicated regulatory frame-
work for important investments
NRAs	might	prefer	 to	apply	 their	default	national	 regulatory	
framework	 to	projects	of	 common	 interest,	motivated	by	 the	
advantage	of	a	simple	framework	and	by	the	avoidance	of	the	
costs	 to	 administer	 additional	 dedicated	 frameworks	 and	 to	
develop	new	skills.6
This	could	be	 justified	 in	member	states	with	 few	projects	of	
common	 interest	 that	 are	 not	 significantly	 more	 risky	 than	
other	 investments;	 or	 in	 member	 states	 with	 predominantly	
multi-jurisdictional	 investments	 so	 that	 all	 investments	 are	
like	 projects	 of	 common	 interest;	 or	 in	 member	 states	 with	
very	strong	return	on	equity	incentives	and/or	risk	mitigation	
incentives.	Note	that	in	the	latter	case,	there	is	no	risk	of	under-
paying,	which	is	an	EU	issue,	but	there	is	a	risk	of	overpaying,	
which	is	a	national	issue.
5.	 The	 “Deliberation	 of	 the	 French	Energy	Regulatory	Commission	 of	 3	
April	 2013	deciding	on	 the	 tariffs	 for	 the	use	of	 a	high-voltage	public	
electricity	 grid”,	 for	 instance,	 foresees	 variable	 bonuses	 and	 penalties	
linked	to	the	project’s	performance	that	can	even	become	negative	to	the	
extent	that	the	flat	lump-sum	premium	on	return	is	reduced	or	negated.
6.	 E-Control,	 2014.	 Financing	 of	 Infrastructure	 Projects	 -	 Provision	 of	
adequate	Incentives	for	PCIs.	Position	Paper.	
Box 2: FERC experience with case-by-case 
assessment
Section 219 of the Federal Power Act gives FERC new compe-
tences to oversee important interstate investment for which it 
had to introduce a dedicated regulatory framework (Orders 679 
and 679A). FERC has been developing new skills to do case-by-
case assessments, and has ruled on more than 85 cases, repre-
senting over 60 billion USD in potential investment, since 2006.
To access the dedicated framework, a project promoter has to 
submit a case file to FERC, that: identifies the project, provides 
evidence of the investment’s eligibility (e.g. project’s inclusion 
in a regional transmission plan that assesses reliability impact), 
motivates the incentives requested, and demonstrates the link 
between each individual incentive and the project and between 
the total incentive package and the project (e.g. with feasibility 
studies, testimony, etc.). Furthermore, to get a premium return 
on investment, the project promoter must demonstrate that 
risk has been minimized as much as possible (e.g. by requesting 
risk-reducing incentives, by implementing best practices, by 
studying alternatives, etc.).
FERC then reviews the case file, deciding if the proposed project 
is eligible and to what extent the claimed incentives are effec-
tively granted. A review of past cases shows that FERC does not 
refrain from declining eligibility due to insufficient evidence of 
a project’s “importance”, sometimes still granting the claimed 
incentives – fully or partially – conditional on a second review of 
additional evidence of a project’s importance. 
FERC typically grants all risk-mitigating incentives requested, 
but tends to adjust the claimed premiums on return on invest-
ment downwards (e.g. 1.50% claimed, but only 1.00% granted) 
after taking into account the risk-mitigating incentives that have 
been granted as part of the total incentive package. A typically 
claimed risk-mitigating incentive is the possibility to recover 
all costs from a stranded investment. FERC is aware that such 
incentive can imply significantly overpaying for bad projects 
and therefore makes this incentive conditional on the stranding 
being beyond the control of the project promoter and on the 
costs having been incurred efficiently. FERC then reviews both 
conditions when a promoter asks to activate the incentive after 
a project has stranded.
Over time, FERC has build up experience that makes case-by-
case rulings on incentive packages more transparent and more 
predictable. With the burden of proof lying with the project 
promoters and FERC having knowledge from all proposed pro-
jects, the typical information asymmetry between regulatory 
authority and project promoter reduces or might even reverse, 
giving the information advantage to the competent regulatory 
authority.
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Member states with a dedicated regulatory frame-
work for important investments
A	dedicated	regulatory	framework	with	a	high	degree	of	case-
by-case	 assessment	 of	 whether	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 a	 project	
is	 entitled	 to	 “dedicated”	 incentives	 allows	 covering	 the	 full	
investment-risk	spectrum.	It	deals	with	both	the	risks	of	under-
paying	and	of	overpaying	for	investment:	a	high-value	high	risk	
project	can	then	claim	more	incentives	to	mitigate	additional	
risks	and/or	increase	return	on	investment,	than	a	project	that	
has	only	moderate	risk,	and	 low-risk	projects	can	be	granted	
an	adequate	return	on	investment	that	is	lower	than	under	the	
default	regulatory	framework.
In	 other	 words,	 some	 countries	 will	 move	 towards	 a	 dedi-
cated	 regulatory	 framework	 for	 projects	 of	 common	 interest	
and	others	will	not.	 In	both	 cases,	 there	 is	 a	 role	 for	 the	EU	
and	ACER	 to	play	because	projects	 of	 common	 interest	play	
an	 instrumental	 supporting	 role	 for	 achieving	 important	EU	
energy	and	climate	policy	objectives.	
The additional roles of the EU, ACER and ENTSO-E
The dedicated regulatory frameworks that have been devel-
oped to achieve national policy objectives must also apply to 
projects of common interest that are important to achieve the 
EU policy objectives. Art 7 paragraph 3 of the Regulation1 could 
be extended to granting the status of highest national signifi-
cance to projects of common interest in the context of their 
regulatory treatment.
To avoid that each NRA needs to develop the necessary skills 
to do case-by-case project assessments, ACER could be given 
the competence to assist NRAs on a voluntary basis. For some 
NRAs the costs of implementing their own dedicated frame-
work might indeed exceed the benefits, while they might still 
prefer to have a dedicated regulatory treatment for projects 
of common interest. Likewise, ENTSO-E could do the same for 
skills-bounded TSOs. 
1.	 Art.	7.3	Regulation	(EU)	No	347/2013:	Where	such	status	exists	
in	national	law,	projects	of	common	interest	shall	be	allocated	the	
status	of	the	highest	national	significance	possible	and	be	treated	
as	such	in	permit	granting	processes	—	and	if	national	law	so	pro-
vides,	in	spatial	planning	—	including	those	relating	to	environ-
mental	 assessments,	 in	 the	manner	 such	 treatment	 is	 provided	
for	in	national	law	applicable	to	the	corresponding	type	of	energy	
infrastructure.
The role of the EU and ACER
The EU and ACER can do sunshine regulation by assessing 
all national frameworks that apply to projects of common 
interest, checking the adequacy to support high-value high-risk 
investment.1,2 
This assessment report can support ACER when it has to rule on 
a cross-border cost allocation (CBCA) where disagreement on 
incentive packages on either side of the border might be one of 
the reasons why NRAs fail to agree to a CBCA. It is indeed natural 
to discuss incentive packages when negotiating CBCA.3
ACER can assist with multi-jurisdictional coordination by 
spreading good practices such as the UK-Belgium experience 
with a joint incentive package for the NEMO interconnector.
1.	 This	could	be	done	by	mapping	the	national	frameworks,	see	for	
instance:	Glachant,	J.M.,	Saguan,	M.,	Rious,	V.,	Douguet,	S.,	2014.	
Harmonizing	electricity	TSO	regulation	to	ensure	financeability	
of	massive	transmission	investment	plan:	the	case	of	North-West	
EU.	FSR	Policy	Brief	2014/01.	January	2014.
2.	 The	ACER	Recommendation	No	03/2014	of	27	June	2014	already	
provides	 some	 sunshine	 regulation	 by	 recording	 what	 current	
regulatory	frameworks	of	Member	States	do	in	terms	of	risk	eval-
uation	and	in	terms	of	granting	incentives.	
3.	 Meeus,	 L.,	 He,	 X.,	 2014.	 Guidance	 for	 project	 promoters	 and	
regulators	for	the	cross-border	cost	allocation	of	projects	of	com-
mon	 interest.	 Florence	 School	 of	Regulation	Policy	Brief,	 Issue	
2014/02.	January	2014.
